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We estimate a spatial autoregressive dynamic panel data model, using information on 5,564 Italian 
municipalities over the period 2001-2011, exploiting their border contiguity as a measure of spatial 
neighborhood. We find a positive and statistically significant effect of neighboring expenditures on total, capital 
and current expenditures of a given municipality. We do not find any evidence of yardstick competition when we 
take account of political effects, while we do find a negative relationship between spatial interaction and the size 
of the municipality for current expenditure. Thus, we conclude that spillover effects drive the strategic 
interaction.  
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Many studies in the last two decades aimed to assess the existence of spatial effects influencing local 
expenditure decisions. In particular, there is a line of empirical works (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002; Revelli, 
2003; Baicker, 2005; Ollè, 2006; Werck et al., 2008; Costa et al., 2015) that investigates whether governments 
make their spending decision taking into account the behavior of their neighbors. In such a framework, 
expenditures decisions would depend not only on income, grants, socio-demographic and political characteristics 
of municipalities, but also on spending decision of neighboring municipalities.  
If municipalities choose their expenditures/taxes - which can affect the welfare of their neighbor’s – by 
maximizing their own welfare and so not taking into account their neighbor’s welfare they end up into inefficient 
levels of expenditure and/or taxes (Gordon, 1983). The existence of strategic interaction between municipalities 
is theoretically explained by several models, e.g. yardstick competition, tax and welfare competition, spillover 
effects (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). In the yardstick competition model, voters with no complete 
information on the cost of public goods and services compare expenditures and taxes in their jurisdiction with 
those of nearby jurisdictions (Salomon, 1987). Therefore, the local policy makers mimic each other’s behavior. 
The second source of spatial interdependence arises in tax competition models. Municipalities face mobile tax 
bases, which depend on both their own tax rate and their neighbors’ tax rate giving rise to tax competition 
(Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Devereux et al., 2008; Rizzo, 2010). Finally, in the traditional “spillover” model, 
public expenditures of a municipality may have positive or negative effects beyond its own boundary, thus 
affecting the welfare of residents in neighboring municipalities (Case et al 1993; Revelli, 2002; Revelli, 2003; 
Baicker, 2005; Ollè, 2006; Werck et al., 2008; Costa et al., 2015). As a result, municipalities might decide the 
level of their own expenditure, by strategically taking into account the expenditures of their neighbors. 
In our work, we first assess the existence of spatial effects influencing the expenditure decisions of Italian 
municipalities and then we identify the sources of this interdependence. We use information on all Italian 
municipalities (except for those in autonomous regions) over the period 2001-2011. By employing the Arellano-
Bond estimator, we estimate an empirical model where the public expenditure in a given municipality depends 
on the average of their own border municipalities’ expenditures and on a set of control variables. We find a 
positive horizontal interdependence in spending decisions of Italian municipalities and we argue that this 
strategic interaction is mainly due to spillover effects and not to yardstick competition. However, some political 
variables turn out to be important determinants of local expenditure. In fact, the election year positively affects 
both total and current expenditure, implying the presence of a political budget cycle among Italian 
municipalities. Moreover, municipalities where the mayor wins the election with a strong majority, show higher 
level of expenditure. Finally, for current expenditure we find that the population size of the municipality 
negatively affects the impact of neighbors’ expenditure on its own expenditure, and above a certain population 
level the positive horizontal interdependence vanishes. 
At the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on spatial interactions in local spending decisions, using data 
on all Italian municipalities. Bordignon et al. (2003) performed a spatial analysis of the Italian municipal 
property tax, by using data on municipalities belonging to the Lombardy region. They found that municipalities 
engage in yardstick competition when setting their property tax rate, but only when the mayor can run for re-
election and the electoral outcome is uncertain. Ermini and Santolini (2010), found a positive and significant 
spillover effect for current expenditure, by relying on a sample of municipalities belonging to the Marche region. 
Finally, Santolini and Bartolini (2012), by using again a sample of municipalities belonging to the Marche 






The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 illustrates the institutional framework. Section 2 discusses the 
econometric strategy and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the estimation results. Section 
7 concludes. 
 
1. Institutional framework: a brief analysis of Italian municipalities’ spending 
The Italian Constitution defines four administrative government layers: central government, regions, provinces 
and municipalities. While most regions and provinces are ruled by ordinary statutes, some of them – the 
autonomous regions and provinces – are ruled by special statutes4. Furthermore, Italy counts 110 provinces, that 
have recently been reformed by the law 56/2014, which reduced their public competences and eliminated the 
possibility of direct elections of their own representatives. Finally, municipalities are the smallest level of 
jurisdiction and are around 8,000, although this number is decreasing because the law 56/2014 is incentivizing 
amalgamation. Most municipalities (around 90%) have less than 15,000 inhabitants and the average size is 
around 6,400 inhabitants. 
Municipalities in Italy are responsible for several public functions such as social welfare services, territorial 
development, local transport, infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police services, water 
delivery, rubbish as well as most infrastructural spending. In our data, municipalities’ total expenditure accounts, 
on average, for about 8.7% of all total public expenditure in Italy during the period 2001-2011. 
Municipalities’ current expenditure, on average, accounts for 71% of the municipalities’ total expenditure, which 
corresponds to 63 billion of euros per year during 2001-2011. Among current expenditure, approximately 75% is 
concentrated on four main functions: Administration and Management, Roads & Transport Services, Planning 
and Environment and Social welfare. The remaining 25% of the current expenditure is allocated to the Municipal 
police, Education, Culture, Sport, and Tourism. Finally, a very low amount of resources goes to three functions, 
Economic development, In-house production services and Justice, managed by many medium-sized and small 
municipalities networking with other municipalities. 
Municipalities are also responsible for investments, which are on average 29% of the total expenditure in the 
period 2001-2011. However, it is worth noting that the share of these expenditures sharply decreased in the 
period 2006-2011, switching from 34% to 21% of total expenditures. At the same time, the share of current 
expenditure has increased. Looking at the specific functions, municipalities allocate resources for investments 
mainly to Administration and Management (16.7% of the capital expenditure) Roads & Transport Services 
(26%), Planning and Environment (27.5%) and Education (9%). 
2. Empirical framework 
Our econometric strategy is based on the estimation of a spatial autoregressive dynamic panel model (Anselin et 
al., 2008), which takes the following form: !"# = % + '!("#)*) + ,-!)"# + ./"# + 0" + 1# + 2"#,   (1) 
where !"# is the per capita expenditure of municipality i at year t, and !("#)*) is its one year lagged value.  -!)",# = ∑ 5"6!6#67"  is the weighted per capita average expenditure of the neighboring municipalities j at time 
t; ω9: are exogenously chosen weights that aggregate the per capita expenditure of neighboring municipalities 
into a single variable WG)9,=. The ω9: are normalized so that ∑ ω9::79 = 1.	 /"# is a matrix of demographic, socio-
                                                          
4 In Italy there are five autonomous regions (Sicilia and Sardegna, which are insular territories, and Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige 




economic and political characteristics of municipality i at time t, and it also includes per capita transfers (current, 
capital or total grants, according to the dependent variable adopted in the estimation) from upper tiers of 
governments (ABCDEFGBE"#).5 µi is an unobserved municipal specific effect, τt is a year specific intercept and εit is 
a mean zero, normally distributed random error. 
In equation (1), the coefficient β measures the degree of inertia of the municipal expenditure. Whereas the 
coefficient γ captures the horizontal interdependence in the municipal expenditure, that is the reaction of the 
expenditure of a given municipality to a one-euro increase in the average expenditure of its neighbors. The 
interpretation of the coefficient γ, as capturing the horizontal interdependence in the municipal expenditure, is 
very common in the literature, see for example Costa et al., (2015), who explicitly interpret it as a spillover 
effect.  
There are three possible cases: 
i) γ =0:  no horizontal interdependence. 
ii) γ< 0: negative horizontal interdependence. A one-euro increase in the average expenditure of 
neighboring municipalities leads to a reduction in the municipal expenditure. 
iii) γ> 0: positive horizontal interdependence. A one-euro increase in the average expenditure of 
neighboring municipalities leads to an increase in the municipal expenditure. 
Since equation (1) includes endogenous variables, the OLS estimation is inappropriate and generates biased 
estimates. The average neighboring expenditure, -!)"#, is endogenous because expenditure interactions are 
symmetric and simultaneous: each municipalities’ behavior affects that of its neighbors and it is affected by their 
behavior in the same way. The lagged dependent variable, !("#)*), which is an important determinant of the 
municipal expenditure (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Larcinese et al., 2013), is correlated with the municipality fixed 
effects in the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent fixed effects estimations (Nickell, 1981). The 
variable ABCDEFGBE"#is also endogenous, as simultaneously decided with municipalities’ expenditures. Thus, we 
use the system GMM (SYS-GMM) dynamic panel estimator (Arellano and Bover,1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998).  
This estimator is an augmented version of the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and is considered 
more efficient (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The SYS-GMM, differently from the difference GMM which just 
employs the difference equation, builds a stacked dataset, one in levels and one in differences. Then the 
differences equations are instrumented with levels, while the levels equations are instrumented with differences6.  
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the assumption that the error term is serially uncorrelated, 
otherwise the instruments are not valid. Hence, to check for the absence of first-order serial correlation in levels 
in a dataset expressed in differences, as that used in a SYS-GMM, we need to check for the absence of second 
order correlation in differences. In fact, we are able to detect first order serial correlation in level between 2"#)* 
and 2"#)H by looking at the correlation between ∆2"#	(∆2"# = 2"# − 2"#)*) and ∆2"#)H	(∆2"#)H = 2"#)H − 2"#)K). 
For this reason, we test, using the differenced estimating equation, for first order autoregressive (AR(1)) serial 
                                                          
5 In the year 2008-2011 we subtract the compensative transfer from the central state that has been introduced to replace the missing 
revenue from the abolished property tax on owner-occupied dwellings.  
6 In terms of equation (1) we take the first difference, then the term !"#)* in 	∆!"#)* (∆!"#)* = !"#)* − !"#)H) is correlated with the term 2"#)* in ∆2"# (∆2"# = 2"# − 2"#)*), so the choice of !"#)* as instrument would bias the estimates. As a results, for the equation in 
differences, we may use lagged values of !"# to form instruments as long as !"#	is lagged two periods or more (!"#)H, !"#)K ,… ). As 
concerns the level equations, the lagged endogenous variables (!"#)*) can be instrumented with ∆!"#)* since it is not correlated with 2"#. 
The same approach is followed for the other 2 endogenous variables, in particular ∆-!)"# is instrumented with two (or more) periods 





correlation in the residuals, which we expect negative and significant7 and for second order autoregressive 
(AR(2)) serial correlation in the residuals, which we expect not significant (Arellano and Bond, 1991), where in 
both tests the null hypothesis is the absence of serial correlation in the residuals.8 
In order to check the validity of the instruments, we employ the standard Hansen test whose null hypothesis is 
the exogeneity of the corresponding instrument (or group of instruments). However, as Roodman (2009) points 
out, the power of the Hansen test might be weakened if the number of instruments is high. Consequently, we test 
the validity of a subset of instruments by using a C-test (Baum, 2006). The C-test estimates the SYS-GMM with 
and without a subset of instruments and uses the difference between the two respective Hansen tests distributed 
as a chi2 and, allowing to test the null hypothesis that the excluded instrument are valid, namely they are 
exogenous. 
The SYS-GMM requires an additional assumption with respect to the difference GMM: the first differenced 
instruments for the level equations must be not correlated with the fixed effects. For this reason we apply the C-
test to the level equation and so comparing the Hansen test of this last equation with that of the SYS-GMM. The 
null hypothesis is that the instruments (which are taken in difference) for the level equations are valid and so the 
SYS-GMM is preferred to the difference GMM. 
Finally, we use a two-step SYS-GMM, which makes the covariance matrix more robust to panel specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, so the estimator is more efficient (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and 
Bond 1998). However, by using this procedure the standard errors might be severely downward biased 
(Roodman, 2009), hence, in order to correct the bias, we apply the correction made by Windmeijer (2005). 
 
3. Data  
The data on Italian municipalities used in our work result from a combination of different archives provided by 
the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and the Institute of National Statistics.  
The data so obtained include a full range of information for the period 2001-2011 and are organized into two 
sections: 1) municipality financial data and 2) municipality demographic, socio-economic and electoral data, 
such as population size, age structure, average income of inhabitants, years of election. We restrict our sample to 
municipalities located in ordinary statute regions. We exclude municipalities that have a specific status of 
metropolitan areas (law 56/2014)9, because they usually provide a wider range of services compared to other 
municipalities. Our final sample includes 5,564 municipalities10, observed from 2001 to 2011, which generates a 
balanced panel data set of 61,204 observations. 
All financial variables are expressed in 2011 real per capita value.  
The Italian municipality balance sheet reports expenditures either in accrual basis or in cash basis. In this system 
of public accountability there is usually a gap (exceeding, sometimes, more than one financial year) between the 
payment (registered on cash basis) and the commitment to it (registered on accrual basis). For this reason, we 
prefer to use the cash basis classification, since the value is reported only if the payment has effectively been 
made. 
                                                          
7 Since ∆2"# is analytically related to ∆2"#)* via the term 2"#)*, a negative first-order serial correlation is always expected in differences. In 
fact,  E(∆2"#, ∆2"#)*)=E(2"# − 2"#)*) E (2"#)* − 2"#)H) = -Var2"#)*. 
 
8 In fact E(∆2"#, ∆2"#)H)=E(2"# − 2"#)*) E (2"#)H − 2"#)K) =0. 
9 Milano, Roma, Napoli, Torino, Bari, Firenze, Bologna, Genova, Venezia and Reggio Calabria. 




3.1 Dependent variables and variables of interest.  
We estimate equation (1) using three different dependent variables: per capita total expenditure (total 
expenditure), per capita current expenditure (current expenditure) and, per capita capital expenditure (capital 
expenditure). We use these aggregate measures of expenditure and not those disaggregated by functions, because 
many municipalities (especially the small ones) have expenditure crossing more than one function, but often 
registered only in one function. 
To isolate the independent impact of neighboring expenditures on the expenditure of a given municipality, we 
use the neighbors’ expenditures variable (neigh expenditure). In order to obtain this variable, as mentioned in 
Section 2, we use a contiguity matrix, implying 5"6 = 1/M" where M" is the number of municipalities 
contiguous to i and 5"6 = 0 otherwise. Hence, for each municipality i in period t, the average value of its own 
neighbors’ per capita expenditure is given by  -!)",# = ∑ 5"6!6#67" . 
3.2 Control variables 
The municipality expenditure can be affected by other factors, accounting for demographic, socio-economic and 
electoral characteristics. In particular, we include a set of time-varying variables, which characterizes the 
municipality’s demographic and economic situation. We include municipality population (population/100) and 
per capita area (area) - square kilometers divided by population - which can capture the presence of scale 
economies and/or congestion effects. The proportion of citizens aged between 0 and 5 (children) and the 
proportion of citizens aged over 65 (aged) can control for some specific public needs (e.g., nursery school, 
nursing homes for the elderly).  
In terms of economic and financial controls, we include the per capita personal income tax base (income/100), 
i.e. a proxy of per capita average income and, per capita transfers (current, capital or total grants) from upper 
tiers of governments (transfers), that vary according to the dependent variable adopted in the estimation. 
Furthermore, we use a set of political variables that may influence local budgets. In particular, we define a 
dummy variable (election), which is equal to 1 for a given municipality in the year of election, during the period 
2001-2011. We measure the political power of the mayor by using the percentage of votes that have been 
necessary to win an election (vote-share). Since Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two consecutive 
terms in office for a mayor, we use a dummy variable (term-limit) which is equal to 1 for all the years a mayor is 
at her second term (and hence she cannot be re-elected) and it is equal to 0 when the mayor is at her first term.  
From 200111, the Italian central government – in order to fulfill the obligations of the European Stability and 
Growth Pact – imposes to each municipality above 5,000 inhabitants the so-called Domestic Stability Pact. 
Depending on the year, it implies a constrained municipal deficit or a threshold on the municipal expenditure. 
Hence, we include a dummy (domestic stability pact) equal to one if a municipality has to fulfill the Domestic 
Stability Pact (i.e. it has more than 5,000 inhabitants) and 0 otherwise. 
As discussed in section 2, the dynamic model we estimate includes the lagged endogenous dependent variable, !("#)*) and two further endogenous variables, namely the average neighboring expenditure, WG)9=, and per 
capita transfers (current, capital or total grants) from upper tiers of governments (ABCDEFGBE"#). Therefore, all 
these variables are instrumented by using their lags12. 
                                                          
11 See law 388/2000, article 53. 





The summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 1. 
Insert table 1 here 
4. Results 
We first estimate equation (1) by using the OLS estimator, with and without neighboring expenditure variable 
(col. 1 and 2, Table 2), then we replicate the previous estimation by applying the FE estimator (col. 3 and 4, 
Table 2) and, finally, we perform the SYS-GMM estimator (col. 5 and 6, Table 2).  
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the OLS estimation without the neighboring expenditure (col. 
1, Table 2), is positive (0.52) and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that expenditure shows a certain 
degree of inertia. This is also confirmed when we introduce the neighboring expenditure (neigh expenditure), 
whose coefficient, which accounts for the spatial interdependence of municipal expenditures, is positive (0.08) 
and statistically significant at 1% (col. 2, Table 2). 
These results remain the same when we include municipality fixed effects. In particular, without neighboring 
expenditure, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive (0.26) and statistically 
significant at 1% (col. 3, Table 2). When we include the neighboring expenditure, its estimated coefficient is 
positive (0.11), statistically significant at 1% (col. 4, Table 2) and higher than that obtained by using the OLS. 
As previously discussed, the estimation of equation (1) by both OLS and FE estimators leads to biased and 
inconsistent estimations, hence we apply the SYS-GMM estimator. In this case the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is positive and statistically significant at 1%, both in the specification without neighboring 
expenditure (0.32; col. 5, Table 2) and in that with neighboring expenditure (0.31; col. 6, Table 2). This confirms 
the inertia of the municipal expenditure. The coefficient of neighboring expenditure is positive (0.16) and 
statistically significant at 10%. What this simply suggests is that there is a positive horizontal interdependence in 
the expenditure of Italian municipalities, such that a one-euro increase in the average expenditure of the 
neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase in the expenditure of municipality i of 0.16 euro. 
Looking at the other control variables, we find that the coefficient of total transfers is always positive in all 
specifications. In particular, in the SYS-GMM (col. 6; Table 2), the estimated coefficient of total transfers is 
positive (0.38) and statistically significant at 1%, implying that grants have an important impact on spending 
decision at the municipal level.13 Moreover, municipalities’ geographic and demographic characteristics have 
also an effect on total expenditures. The coefficient of per capita area (area) is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% (col. 6; Table 2), suggesting that a 50% increase of per capita area (e.g. from its average value 
of 0.02 to 0.03) would increase per capita expenditure by 43.09 euro. The variable area per capita captures the 
effect of economies of scale, i.e. the less populated a municipality is the higher the expenditure. 
The coefficient of population (population/100) is positive (0.12) and statistically significant at 1% (col. 6; Table 
2), accounting for the presence of congestion effects. Per capita income of residents (income/100) has a 
coefficient of around 1.79, statistically significant at 1% (col. 6, Table 2).  
The coefficient of children is negative and highly significant, and it implies that an increase of children’s share 
in the population by, for example, 20% (from the average value of 0.05 to 0.06) corresponds to a reduction of 
20.23 euro in the per capita expenditure. This is also an economy of scale effect.  
All our specifications include political and institutional variables as well. Focusing on the SYS-GMM, the 
dummy variable election has a positive coefficient (20.24), vote-share is also positive (75.86) and they are both 
significant at 1% (col. 6, Table 2). Finally, the dummy variable domestic stability pact shows a negative 
                                                          
13 Transfers from upper level of government represent a significant part, appoximatley around 25%, of the Italian municipal financing 




coefficient (-38.08) and statistically significant at 1% (col. 6, Table 2). This result confirms the strength of the 
Domestic Stability Pact in constraining local expenditures, in line with recent findings (Grembi et al., 2016).14  
Insert Table 2 here 
In Table 3 we report the results of the estimations using as dependent variable the two components of total 
expenditures: current expenditure (col. 1) and capital expenditure (col. 2). We only apply our favorite 
econometric model, the SYS-GMM, with the specification including the neighbors’ expenditure. We still 
instrument our lagged dependent variable and the other endogenous variables (neigh expenditure and transfers). 
Looking at the estimates for current expenditure (col. 1, Table 3), the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive (0.11), statistically significant at 10% and smaller than the one estimated for total expenditure 
(col. 6, Table 2). The estimated coefficient associated with current expenditure of neighboring muncipalities 
(neigh expenditure) is positive (0.65), statistically significant at 1% and increases considerably with respect to 
the one estimated for total expenditure.  
Moving to capital expenditure (col. 2, Table 3), the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
positive (0.31), statistically significant at 1% and very similar to the one estimated for total expenditure (col. 6, 
Table 2). The coefficient of capital expenditure of neighboring muncipalities is sligthly lower than the one 
estimated for total expenditure (0.10), and statistically significant at 5%. 
These results suggest the presence of positive horizontal interdependence of both current and capital expenditure 
among Italian municipalities, and such an effect is more pronounced for current expenditure. Indeed, a one-euro 
increase in the average current expenditure of the neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.65 euro 
in the municipality’s current expenditure. Whereas, a one-euro increase in the average capital expenditures of the 
neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.10 euro in municipality’s capital expenditure.  
Control variables are also very informative about the determinants of both current and capital municipal 
expenditure. In particular, the coefficient associated with population/100 is positive and statistically significant, 
showing the presence of congestion effects, and the coefficient of per-capita area (area) is positive and 
statistically significant, implying the presence of economies of scale. The coefficient associated with vote-share 
is positive and statistically significant and the dummy variable domestic stability pact shows a negative and 
significant (at 1%) coefficient. 
Other control variables, such as current transfers, income/100 and election are not statistically significant when 
using current expenditure (col. 1, Table 3). When we use capital expenditure (col. 2, Table 3), the coefficients of 
capital transfers (0.47), income/100 (0.26) and election (17.57) are all positive and significant at 1%.  
To sum up, all our results show the presence of a positive horizontal interdependence in spending decision 
among Italian municipalities, especially for current expenditure. We also find a degree of inertia of the 
expenditure. Furthermore, political variables are important factors of municipal expenditure. The percentage of 
votes (vote-share) obtained by a mayor in an election is always statistically significant and positively impacts on 
expenditures. This means that a mayor with a strong majority in a municipality council spends more than a 
mayor with a weak leadership. In the year of election, we find an increase of total expenditure, driven by capital 
expenditure.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 
                                                          
14 This result should be read with some warning.  In fact, the variable domestic stability pact (which is 0 if population is lower than 5,000 
inhabitants and 1 otherwise) also accounts for other municipal rules. For example the mayor’s salary and the amount of transfers received 




4.1 Robustness check 
We re-estimate the previous models by using different neighbor’s matrices. In particular, we define this new 
neighbors’ variable (neigh expenditure) by using two weighted matrices. We first consider neighbors all 
municipalities distant up to 25 km from a given municipality and we weigh the corresponding expenditure with 
the inverse of that distance; above 25 km the weight is 0. Then, by using the same procedure, we classify as 
neighbors all municipalities whose distance from a given municipality is no more than 50 km. 
We perform the estimations for the total expenditure and its two components (current expenditure and capital 
expenditure) using the two spatial matrices, separately. The estimates obtained using a neighbor’s distance less 
than 25 km confirm the results we have obtained in the previous analysis (col. 1, 2 and 3, Table 4). The strategic 
interaction between expenditures persists with each type of expenditure. The coefficient of neighboring 
expenditure (neigh expenditure) is 0.22 and significant at 10% when using total expenditure, and it is very 
similar (0.20) for capital expenditure; however it becomes significant at 1% and increases to 0.77 with current 
expenditure. 
When we use a neighbor’s distance up to 50 km, the estimates confirm again our previous results, for all types of 
expenditure (col. 4, 5 and 6, Table 4). Precisely, when we use total expenditure (col. 4, Table 4) the coefficient 
of neighbor’s expenditure (neigh expenditure) is 0.34 and statistically significant at 1%. In the other two cases,  
neighboring expenditures have coefficients of 0.88 (at 1% significance) and 0.21 (at 10% significance), for 
current and capital expenditures, respectively.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
5. Testing for political sources of the interdependence 
The estimates presented so far show that there is a strategic interaction between spending decisions at local level. 
This feature holds for both current and capital expenditure. The presence of strategic interaction might be 
reasonably due to the fact that citizens living in the neighboring municipalities can enjoy the provision of local 
public goods in a given municipality. This implies the presence of spillover effects (Case et al., 1993). However, 
the strategic interaction can also be justified by yardstick competition between municipalities (Besley and Case, 
1995): voters judge expenditure levels (and so local public good provision) by looking at what comparable 
municipalities do. 
The empirical studies on yardstick competition link the spending interaction with the political process. In 
particular, they assume that the interdependence may be effective in pre-electoral and electoral years (Bordignon 
et al., 2003; Ollé, 2003), when politicians mimic the behavior of their neighbor’s to capture voters’ preferences 
and to win the elections. This behavior is more pronounced when politicians are not lame duck, which implies 
that they are interested in obtaining voters’ confidence (Bordignon et al., 2003). Voters with no complete 
information about the type of incumbent, in fact, compare their municipal expenditures with those of nearby 
municipalities (Salmon, 1987). 
We test whether the spatial interaction found in the baseline regressions is due to yardstick competition, by 
interacting the neighboring expenditure variable with political dummies. Therefore, we consider the following 
model: !"# = % + '!("#)*) + ,-!)"# + O(PQRSASTCR_VWMMX"# ∗ -!)"#) + ./"# + 0" + 1# + 2"#. (2) 
We estimate equation (2) using SYS-GMM and instrumenting our lagged dependent variable and the other 
endogenous variables (neighboring expenditure, neigboring expenditure interacted with political dummy and 




political dummy term-limit and in the other case we use election. As dependent variable we cosider the total 
expenditure and its two components (current expenditure and capital expenditure).  
In the first specification (Table 5), if there is yardstick competition we expect the interaction between term-limit 
and neighbors’ expenditure to be negative, because a lame-duck mayor should not have any electoral concern. 
However, the interaction term (neigh expenditure*termlim) is not statistically significant for total (col. 1), 
current (col. 2) and capital (col. 3) expenditures.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
In the second specification (Table 6), we expect the interaction between election and neighbors’ expenditure to 
be positive (Costa et al., 2015). However, the interaction term (neigh expenditure*election) is never statistically 
significant. 
These results reveal the absence of yardstick competition as source of interaction: municipalities do not mimic 
each other to get votes and the spatial interdependence is not sensitive to the electoral cycle. Thus, we can 
conclude that the strategic interaction found in the baseline specification is due to spillovers of the provided 
public goods. 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
6. Spillover effects and the size of municipalities 
We perform an additional test to verify whether the municipality size influences the spatial interdependence. The 
hypothesis is that neighboring municipalities with small size, in term of population, tend to show a larger 
expenditure’s interaction. The intuition is that a highly populated municipality should hardly react to changes in 
expenditure by a small neighboring municipality, because there are negligible spillover effects on its residents. 
Therefore, we include in the model the interaction of the neighbor’s expenditure with the variable PQPWRCASQD"# 
and we estimate the following model: !"# = % + '!("#)*) + ,-!)"# + Z(PQPWRCASQD"# ∗ -!)"#) + ./"# + 0" + 1# + 2"#.   (3) 
We apply the SYS-GMM instrumenting all the endogenous variables (neighboring expenditure, neigboring 
expenditure interacted with population/100 and transfers) and we use as dependent variables total (col.1, Table 
7), current (col.2, Table 7) and capital expenditure (col.3, Table 7).  
The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant for both total 
expenditure (0.45, 1% significant) and capital expenditure (0.43, 1% significant), while it is positive (0.08) but 
not significant for current expenditure. Neighboring expenditure is positive and statistically significant for total 
expenditure (0.45, 1% significant), current expenditure (0.66, 1% significant) and capital expenditure (0.47, 1% 
significant). We also find that the coefficient of the interaction between population and neighbor’s expenditure 
(neigh expenditure*population/100) is negative in all specifications, and significant only for current expenditure 
(-0.62, 10% significant). This means that the spatial interdependence between a given municipality and its 
neighbors’ expenditures becomes weaker and weaker the higher is its population. 15  
 
Insert Table 7 here 
                                                          
15 Notice that above a certain size – approximately 40,000 inhabitants – municipalities do not react anymore to a change in neighbors’ 
expenditure. In fact, the linear combination of the coefficients of neigh expenditure + neigh expenditure*population/100 is positive and 





This result is consistent with our finding that spatial interdependence is not due to political factors; therefore, we 
can conclude that it must be due to spillover effects. In fact, a negative relationship between spatial interaction 
and municipality’s size implies that a highly populated municipality should hardly react to changes in per capita 
expenditure of a small municipality. In terms of public goods spillovers, these changes have a negligible per 
capita impact on the residents of a large municipality.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we explored the existence of spatial interactions in spending decisions among Italian municipalities. 
We estimated a spatial autoregressive dynamic panel data model, by using data on 5,564 Italian municipalities 
for the period 2001-2011, and exploiting their border contiguity. We found a positive and statistically significant 
effect of neighbors’ expenditure on the expenditure of a given municipality, for total, capital and current 
expenditure. We did not find any evidence of yardstick competition, and therefore we are confident that spillover 
effects drive the strategic interaction. This conclusion is confirmed by the results of a negative relationship 
between spatial interaction and municipality’s size for current expenditures. A highly populated municipality 
should hardly react to changes in per capita expenditure of a small municipality, because public goods spillovers 




• [\PGDVSAWBG"# (total, current, capital); !",#. Per capita expenditures of municipality i at time t, expressed in 
2011 Euros and in cash flow terms. These financial data are taken from the official municipality balance 
sheets available on http://finanzalocale.interno.it/ser/i_banchedati.html provided by the Italian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. 
Endogenous variables 
• ]GS^ℎ	G\PGDVSAWBG"# (total, current, capital) ; -!)",# = ∑ 5"6!6#67" . It is the per capita average 
expenditure of neighboring municipalities of the municipality i at time t, expressed in 2011 Euros and in 
cash flow terms. The concept of neighbors varies across specifications of the model: border municipalities, 
25 km distant municipalities and 50 km distant municipalities. 
• [\PGDVSAWBG(−1)"#	(AQACR, TWBBGDA, TCPSACR)	; !",#)*. One year lagged value of the variable [\PGDVSAWBG"#. 
• aBCDEFGBE"# (total, current and capital). Per capita upper tier governments’ transfers to municipality i at 
time t, expressed in 2011 Euros and in cash flow terms. These financial data are taken from the official 
municipality balance sheets. Transfers vary according to the dependent variable adopted in the estimation. 
For the years 2008-2011 we subtract the compensative transfer from the central government that has been 
introduced to replace the missing revenue from the abolished property tax on owner-occupied dwellings. 
Demographic and socio-economic variables 
• bQPWRCASQD/100"# is the number of inhabitants of municipality i at time t, taken from 
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/113712 provided by the Institute of National Statistics. 
• cℎSRVBGD"# is the ratio of individuals aged 0-5 years to the total population of municipality i at time t, taken 




• d^GV"# is the ratio of individuals over 65 years of age to the total population of municipality i at time t, 
taken from http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/113712 provided by the Institute of National Statistics. 
• dBGC"# is the area of the municipality i divided by its own population. Area data were taken from 
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/113712 provided by the Institute of National Statistics. 
• eDTQMG/100"# is the per capita income for municipality i at time t. Income data were taken from the 
Ministry of Economy. 
• [RGTASQD"# dummy=1 in the year of election. Data are taken from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ provided 
by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
• aGBM− RSMSA"# dummy=1 if the mayor cannot run for reelection, taken from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ 
provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
• fQAG − EℎCBG"# is the percentage share of the mayor in the vote for the election. If a municipality have more 
than 15,000 inhabitants and the electoral system is a double ballot system, the vote-share refers to the first 
round of election. Data are taken from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ provided by the Italian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. 
• gQMGEAST	EAChSRSAX	PCTA"# dummy=1 if a municipality is imposed the Domestic Stability Pact, namely it 
has more than 5,000 inhabitants.  
 
References 
Anselin, L., Le Gallo, J., & Jayet, H. (2008). Spatial panel econometrics. In The econometrics of panel data (pp. 
625-660). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components 
models, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29-51 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991) Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an 
Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic Studies, 58: 277-297 
Baicker, K. (2005). The spillover effects of state spending. Journal of public economics, 89(2): 529-544. 
Bartolini, D. and Santolini, R. (2012) Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending 
decisions, Annals of Regionals Science, 49:213-235, DOI 10.1007/s00168-011-0437-5 
Baum, C. F. (2006). An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. Stata press. 
Besley, T. and Case A. (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from 
gubernatorial term limits, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 769-798 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, 
Journal of Econometrics, 87: 115-143 
Bordignon, M., Cerniglia, F. and Revelli, F. (2003) In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of 
Italian municipality property tax setting, Journal of Urban Economics, 54: 199-217 
Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. 
International regional science review, 26(2): 175-188. 
Case, A. C., Hines, J. R. J. and Rosen H. S. (1993) Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence. 




Costa, H., Veiga, G. and Portela, M. (2015) Interactions in Local Governments’ Spending Decisions: Evidence 
from Portugal, Regional Studies, 49:9, 144-1456, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2013.835798 
Devereux, M. P., Lockwood, B. and Redoano, M. (2008) Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?, 
Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6): 1210-1235 
Ermini, B. and Santolini, R. (2010) Local Expenditure interaction in Italian municipalities: do local partnership 
make a difference?, Local Government Studies, 36(5), 655-677 
Gordon R. H. (1983) An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 
567-587. 
Grembi, V., Nannicini, T. and Troiano, U. (2016) "Do Fiscal Rules Matter?" American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 8(3): 1-30. DOI: 10.1257/app.20150076 
Kanbur, R. and Keen, M. (1993) Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries 
Differ in Size, American Economic Review, 83(4): 877-92 
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L. and Testa, C. (2013). Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate 
Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget, Economics and Politics, 25(3): 257-282 
Nickell, S. (1981) Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica, 49(6):1417-1426 
Ollé, A. S. (2003). Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition 
government, and ideology. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(4): 685-713. 
Ollé, A. S. (2006). Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in 
Spain. Journal of Urban Economics, 59(1): 32-53. 
Revelli, F. (2002) Testing the tax mimicking versus expenditure spillover hypotheses using English data, 
Applied Economics, 34:14, 1723-1731. DOI:10.1080/00036840210122353 
Revelli, F. (2003) Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government structures, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 53: 29-53, DOI:10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00512-0 
Revelli, F. (2005) On Spatial Public Finance Empirics, International Tax and Public Finance, 12: 4751-1492  
Rizzo, L. (2010). Interaction between federal taxation and horizontal tax competition: theory and evidence from 
Canada. Public Choice, 144(1-2): 369-387. 
Roodman, D. (2009). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 
71(1): 135-158. 
Salmon, P. (1987) Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford 
University Press, 3(2): 24-43 
Veiga, L. and Veiga, F. (2007) Political business cycles at the municipal level, Public Choice, 131(1): 45-64 
Werck, K., Heyndels, B., & Geys, B. (2008). The impact of ‘central places’ on spatial spending patterns: 
evidence from Flemish local government cultural expenditures. Journal of Cultural Economics, 32(1): 35-58. 
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. 
Journal of econometrics, 126(1), 25-51. 
Table	1.Summary	statistics	
Variable Number  of observations Mean 
Standard  
deviation. Minimum Maximum 
      
Total expenditure 61,204 1,251.95 1,101.98 30.17 43,906.23 
Current expenditure 61,204 742.04 390.06 5.63 13,023.92 
Capital expenditure 61,204 509.91 851.44 0 42,127.01 
Total transfers 61,204 620.43 834.36 7.14 33,814.22 
Current transfers 61,204 277.61 234.39 1.10 14,177.54 
Capital transfers 61,204 342.82 714.18 0.00 32,906.61 
Population/100 61,204 64.75 13.97 0.04 2653.68 
Children (0-5 years old) 61,204 0.05 0.01 0 0.13 
Aged (>65 years old) 61,204 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.63 
Area 61,204 0.02 0.04 0 1.15 
Income/100 61,204 109.34 36.79 2.13 1965.78 
Domestic stability pact 61,204 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Election 61,204 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Term-limit 61,204 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Vote-share 61,204 0.59 0.16 0.16 1 
Notes: All the variables are averages for the period 2001-2011. The financial variables are in real, per capita 
and cash flows terms. Children, aged, area and income are divided by population. 
  
Table 2 Estimation results for total expenditure with OLS, FE estimator and SYS-GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Total expenditure Total expenditure Total expenditure Total expenditure Total expenditure Total expenditure 
Model OLS OLS FE FE SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
       
Expenditure (-1) 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Neigh expenditure  0.08***  0.11***  0.16* 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.10) 
Transfers 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) 
Population/100 0.10*** 0.06*** -2.15*** -1.90*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) 
Children -1,406.81*** -1,410.96*** -1,115.82 -1,068.08 -2,055.45*** -2,023.64*** 
 (416.62) (414.55) (774.43) (766.87) (551.51) (517.72) 
Aged -200.26* -311.72*** 74.93 98.73 478.51*** 228.99 
 (120.79) (112.81) (307.60) (302.87) (181.54) (243.16) 
Area 1,793.84*** 1,469.89*** 9,070.05*** 8,637.67*** 5,351.47*** 4,309.18*** 
 (310.08) (308.65) (3,405.03) (3,280.87) (641.12) (949.25) 
Income/100 2.16*** 2.15*** 3.46*** 3.33*** 1.90*** 1.79*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.83) (0.82) (0.33) (0.39) 
Domestic stability pact -9.99** -6.23 -77.19*** -73.39** -49.52*** -38.08*** 
 (4.40) (4.08) (28.96) (29.09) (9.82) (11.04) 
Election 11.59** 11.66** 22.54*** 22.13*** 20.86*** 20.24*** 
 (4.89) (4.85) (3.93) (3.92) (4.52) (4.87) 
Term-limit 1.98 3.11 7.30* 7.15* 1.52 3.03 
 (4.01) (3.10) (4.15) (4.14) (3.95) (3.96) 
Vote-share 4.69 4.32 20.18 21.43 88.70*** 75.86*** 
 (15.87) (15.82) (20.69) (20.73) (27.91) (28.11) 
Constant 149.47*** 104.7*** 189.42 69.40 287.19*** 181.99** 
 (35.38) (36.37) (155.31) (155.64) (49.79) (73.11) 
       
Number of observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 
R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.45 0.46   
Number of municipalities     5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value)     0.00 0.00 
Hansen (p-value)     0.78 0.50 
AR2 (p-value)     0.86 0.73 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. In all regressions, we control for time fixed effects. In regression 
(3), (4), (5) and (6) we also control for municipal fixed effects. In regression (5) and (6) Expenditure (-1), neigh expenditure and total transfers are 
instrumented using SYS-GMM. In col. (5) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented applying difference GMM, by using lags 1, 2 and 3; the 
variable transfers (total transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 3 and 4. In col. (6) the variable Expenditure (-1) is 
instrumented applying difference GMM by using lags 1, 2 and 3; the variable neigh expenditure is instrumented applying SYS-GMM, by using 
lags 3 and 4; the variable transfers (total transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 3 and 4. The validity of the instruments is 
checked by using the standard Hansen test and the C test (results are available upon request).  
Table 3 Estimation results for current and capital expenditures with the SYS-GMM estimator 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Current expenditure Capital expenditure 
Model SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
   
Expenditure (-1) 0.11* 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
Neigh expenditure 0.65*** 0.10** 
 (0.18) (0.04) 
Transfers -0.31 0.47*** 
 (0.22) (0.09) 
Population/100 0.23*** 0.02*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Child -1,307.33*** -674.73* 
 (457.12) (372.17) 
Aged 619.33** 73.29 
 (292.07) (87.15) 
Area 2,491.60*** 2,089.33*** 
 (688.68) (359.32) 
Income/100 -0.12 0.26*** 
 (0.55) (0.07) 
Domestic stability pact -43.26*** -34.20*** 
 (15.38) (4.70) 
Election -0.52 17.57*** 
 (1.90) (4.08) 
Term-limit -2.63 3.69 
 (2.60) (3.21) 
Vote-share 56.46*** 47.64** 
 (19.54) (18.50) 
Constant 120.06 77.22*** 
 (109.93) (29.65) 
   
Number of observations 55,640 55,640 
Number of municipalities 5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (p-value) 0.26 0.80 
AR2 (p-value) 0.58 0.77 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. We control for time and 
municipal fixed effects. In col. (1) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented 
applying difference GMM, by using lags 1, 2, 3 and 4; the variable neigh 
expenditure is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 7 and 8; the 
variable transfers (current transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by 
using lag 4. In col. (2) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented applying 
difference GMM by using lags 1 and 2; the variable neigh expenditure is 
instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 2 and 3; the variable transfers 
(capital transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 3 and 4. 
The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard Hansen test 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Weighting matrix !!"!"  !!"!"  
Dependent variable Total expenditure Current  expenditure 
Capital 
expenditure Total expenditure 
Current 
expenditure Capital expenditure 
Model SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
       
Expenditure (-1) 0.35*** 0.10* 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.15 0.33*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.22) (0.06) 
Neigh expenditure 0.22* 0.77*** 0.20* 0.34*** 0.88*** 0.21** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.29) (0.10) 
Transfers 0.31*** -0.22 0.40*** 0.36*** -0.21 0.47*** 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09) (0.37) (0.09) 
Population/100 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.02* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) 
Child -2,270.74*** -1,317.45*** -611.47 -1,946.55*** -1,244.68* -842.77** 
 (566.61) (440.09) (393.31) (525.01) (684.46) (393.44) 
Aged 154.45 454.63 45.03 30.08 334.33 -44.46 
 (249.82) (298.53) (120.89) (231.42) (405.33) (120.55) 
Area 4,650.75*** 2,632.93*** 2,221.82*** 4,916.38*** 3,069.51*** 2,041.17*** 
 (833.76) (614.97) (440.93) (774.87) (1,153.48) (406.78) 
Income/100 1.72*** 0.21 0.32*** 1.91*** 0.14 0.38*** 
 (0.36) (0.57) (0.10) (0.31) (0.84) (0.10) 
Domestic stability pact -33.69** -28.14* -26.63*** -28.33** -27.12 -26.93*** 
 (13.66) (15.90) (8.11) (12.37) (22.48) (7.25) 
Election 19.36*** -0.96 17.17*** 20.51*** -0.84 18.15*** 
 (4.71) (2.15) (4.28) (4.67) (2.75) (4.09) 
Term-limit 4.13 -2.63 3.67 3.59 -3.71 3.10 
 (3.91) (2.56) (3.25) (3.91) (4.28) (3.25) 
Vote-share 94.28*** 45.12** 50.91*** 80.98*** 37.47 50.38*** 
 (26.43) (20.30) (17.23) (27.31) (32.73) (18.33) 
Constant 124.69 19.46 39.36 -19.18 -68.83 41.52 
 (117.91) (118.79) (51.86) (121.60) (106.10) (55.89) 
       
Number of 
observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of 
municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Hansen (p-value) 0.83 0.18 0.50 0.38 0.23 0.58 
AR2 (p-value) 0.76 0.89 0.72 0.70 0.89 0.84 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. We control for 
time and municipal fixed effects. The variables neigh expenditure and transfers are always instrumented using SYS-GMM, instead Expenditure 
(-1) in all the regressions is instrumented using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 4 and 5 for 
the variables neigh expenditure and transfers (total transfers); (2) lags 1, 2, 3 and for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 7 and 8 for the variable 
neigh expenditure, lags 4 and 5 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (3) lags 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 4 and 5 
for the variable neigh expenditure and lag 4 for the variable transfers (capital transfers); (4) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 3 
and 4 for the variable neigh expenditure and for the variable transfers (total transfers); (5) lags 1 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 4, 5 and 
6 for the variable neigh expenditure and lag 5 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (6) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), 4 
and 5 for the variable neigh expenditure and lags 3 and 4 for the variable transfers (capital transfers). The validity of the instruments is checked 
by using the standard Hansen test and the C tests (results are available upon request).  
 
  
Table 5 Estimation results for yardstick competition model with the interaction 
between neigh expenditure and term-limit  
 (1) (2) (3) 





Model SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
    
Expenditure (-1) 0.30*** 0.11* 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Neigh expenditure 0.16* 0.70*** 0.08** 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.04) 
Neigh expenditure * 
term-limit 0.03 -0.01 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Transfers 0.38*** -0.30 0.48*** 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.09) 
    
Number of observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of 
municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (p-value) 0.59 0.38 0.76 
AR2 (p-value) 0.68 0.67 0.75 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. We control 
for time and municipal fixed effects, population/100, child, aged, area, income/100, domestic 
stability pact, election, term-limit, vote-share. The variables Expenditure (-1), neigh 
expenditure, the interaction neigh expenditure * term-limit and transfers are always 
instrumented using SYS-GMM, excluding for Expenditure (-1) in regression (2) instrumented 
using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 3 
and 4 for the variables neigh expenditure, transfers (total transfers) and neigh expenditure * 
term-limit; (2) lags 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 7 and 8 for the variable 
neigh expenditure, lags 3 and 4 for neigh expenditure * term-limit and lag 4 for the variable 
transfers (current transfers); (3) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 2 and 3 
for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 3, 4 and 5 for the variables neigh expenditure * term-
limit and  transfers (capital transfers). The validity of the instruments is checked by using the 




Table 6 Estimation results for yardstick competition model with the interaction 
between neigh expenditure and election 
 (1) (2) (3) 





Model SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
    
Expenditure (-1) 0.34*** 0.10* 0.31*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Neigh expenditure 
 0.12* 0.62*** 0.11*** 
 (0.07) (0.16) (0.04) 
Neigh expenditure * 
election 
 
0.10 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
Transfers 0.34*** -0.27 0.46*** 
 (0.08) (0.20) (0.09) 
    
Number of observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of 
municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (p-value) 0.34 0.32 0.92 
AR2 (p-value) 0.78 0.65 0.76 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. We 
control for time and municipal fixed effects, population/100, child, aged, area, income/100, 
domestic stability pact, election, term-limit, vote-share. The variables Expenditure (-1), 
neigh expenditure, the interaction neigh expenditure * election and transfers are always 
instrumented using SYS-GMM, excluding for Expenditure (-1) in regression (2) 
instrumented using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable 
Expenditure (-1), lags 3 and 4 for the variables neigh expenditure, neigh expenditure * 
election and transfers (total transfers); (2) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), 
lags 7 and 8 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh 
expenditure * election, and lag 4 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (3) lags 1 and 
2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 2 and 3 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 6 
and 7 for the variable neigh expenditure * election, and lags 3 and 4 for the variable 
transfers (capital transfers). The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard 




Table 7 Estimation results of the interdependence and size of municipalities 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Total expenditure Current expenditure Capital expenditure 
Model SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
    
Expenditure (-1) 0.45*** 0.08 0.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) 
Neigh expenditure 
 0.45*** 0.66*** 0.47*** 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) 
Neigh expenditure * 
population/100 
 
-0.25 -0.62* -0.21 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.32) 
Transfers 0.12 -0.17 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.22) (0.17) 
    
Number of observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 
AR1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen (p-value) 0.21 0.53 0.48 
AR2 (p-value) 0.64 0.83 0.49 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for year and 
municipal fixed effects, population/100, child, aged, area, income/100, domestic stability pact, election, 
term-limit, vote-share. The variables Expenditure (-1), neigh expenditure, the interaction neigh expenditure 
* population/100 and transfers are always instrumented using SYS-GMM, excluding for Expenditure (-1) 
in regression (2) instrumented using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable 
Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure, and lags 6 and 7 for the variables neigh 
expenditure * population/100 and transfers; (2) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 
6 for the variables neigh expenditure and neigh expenditure * population/100, lags 4 and 5 for the variable 
transfers (current transfers); (3) lags 1, 2, 3 and 4 order lags for the variable Expenditure (-1), lag 5 for the 
variable neigh expenditure, and lags 6 and 7 for the variables neigh expenditure * population/100 and 
transfers (capital transfers). The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard Hansen test 
and the C tests (results are available upon request).  
 
